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UNINSURED MOTORIST PLEADING

PLEADING UNDER THE VIRGINIA UNINSURED
MOTORIST STATUTE
=
DANIEL HARTNETT
*

Although the Virginia uninsured motor vehicle statute has been
in operation since 1958, uncertainty still exists in the procedural
moves a defense lawyer may take in representing an insurance company
in an action against a known uninsured motorist or an unknown John
Doe. The decisions of the past two years, together with some excellent
Law Review articles, have done much to clarify the inherent obscurities of the statute as it was originally written and later amended.
A good deal, however, remains to be decided in respect to the
pleadings that may or may not be filed and defenses raised, together
with the all important question as to the time various defenses are to
be raised.
In order to determine whether or not a certain pleading or defense should be filed, and when it should be filed, it is essential to
analyze the intrinsic nature of the action.
Perhaps the most significant determination the Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals has made during the last two years is to classify
definitely the original action against John Doe or the known uninsured
motorist as one ex delicto and not ex contractu. It is this very distinction that has prompted this article.
The line of cases to be later analyzed has refused to grant the insurance company relief in the tort action when the defenses relied
upon by the company are of a contractual nature and relate to the uninsured motorist endorsement on the policy and not to the tort.
In State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Duncan' the court held that
serving upon the company a copy of the process as required by section 38.1-381(e) (i) was a prerequisite to maintaining the action against
the insurance company, and further that the copy of process had to be
served in the manner prescribed by the statute.2 It is significant that
the action was against the insurance company on the endorsement,
after the judgment had been obtained by Duncan against the unin*Partner, Ayres and Hartnett, Court Green, Accomac, Virginia; Royal Military
Academy, Sandhurst, England, 1949, LL.B. ig6i, University of Virginia.
o

1203 Va. 44 , 125 S.E.2d 154 (1962).
20o3 Va. at 445, 125 S.E.2d at 158.
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sured defendant. The Court held that the insurance company had not
waived its right to have process served on it in the manner prescribed
by law, even though it had engaged in extensive negotiations with the
plaintiff. This was an action arising ex contractu to recover against the
insurance company on its endorsement and therefore this statutory
contractual defense could be interposed by the company.
In the subsequent case of John Doe v. Brown 3 the unknown uninsured motorist was sued as John Doe and service was made on the company in accordance with the statute.4 The company filed a demurrer
and moved the court for a summary judgment on the principal ground
that no report of the accident had been made to the insurance company according to the provisions of the statute5 and that there was no
contact between the John Doe vehicle and the insured vehicle. The
court held that the lower court ruled correctly in not permitting
these defenses, reasoning that this was purely an ex delicto action
against John Doe and therefore these policy defenses could not be
interposed. It pointed out that the statute contains no provision requiring contact between the two vehicles. In the next sentence0 the
court said that the suit was not against the insurance company to recover on the endorsement, which endorsement required contact. If
the insurance company had a provision in its endorsement requiring
contact between the two vehicles, then presumably this provision
would be in conflict with the uninsured motorist statute, although the
case did not so hold. As regards the report required by the statute, the
court found the giving of such to be necessary only in order for the insured to recover under the endorsement on the policy. Therefore,
neither defense was timely raised in the tort action. Of course, the
court expressed no opinion as to whether the defenses would be valid
in a later action on the policy.
However, in Mangus v. John Doe,7 the insurance company, having
been served according to the statute, filed pleadings in its own name,
and in the name of John Doe, in the form of a joint motion to dismiss the motion for judgment, on the ground that the person causing
the injury was not unknown within the purview of the uninsured
motorist statute. The court accepted this defense as being properly
before it, but decided the case adversely to the company, reasoning
that a requirement of due diligence to ascertain the identity of the
'2o3 Va. 508, 125 S.E.2d 159 (1962).

'Va.
'Va.
62o3
72o3

Code Ann. § 38.i-38i(e)(i) (Supp. 1962).
Code Ann. § 3 8.1-38i(d) (Supp. 1962).
Va. at 516, 125 S.E.2d at 165.
Va. 518, 125 S.E.2d 166 (1962).
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unknown motorist could not be found in that statute. The court's
reasoning must be limited to a set of facts where the injured person
had no knowledge of his injury and therefore it was not necessary
for him to inquire as to the identity of the unknown motorist.
Again, in John Doe v. Faulkners the defense as to whether or not
John Doe was a person incapable of testifying, as defined in section
8-286 of the Code, 9 was considered as being properly before the court.
The court, however, considered John Doe to be a person merely unavailable to testify, rather than incapable of doing so. Hence, the insurance company suffered yet another reversal.
The final case decided at the 1962 term on the question of the uninsured motorist law is Hodgson v. John Doe.10 An accident occurred
inTennessee as the result of a no-contact incident with another vehicle.
The policy, issued in Virginia, contained the standard endorsement
required by the Virginia statute. An action was instituted against John
Doe in accordance with the provisions of the Code and service made on
Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company by delivering a copy of the
motion on its registered agent in Lynchburg. The defendant then
filed a plea in abatement challenging the venue of the action and
also a demurrer on the ground that the motion for judgment did not
allege that the accident was reported as required by section 3 8.1- 3 8i(d).
As was to be expected the court had no difficulty in disposing of the
demurrer in respect to reporting the accident, ruling as previously, that
this was not an action on the policy, but merely an action to establish
legal liability against John Doe. However, in ruling on the plea in
abatement, the court, after discussing the point as to whether or not the
plea provided a better writ, proceeded to reverse the trial court which
had sustained the plea in abatement. The reversal was grounded on
the fact that the plea in abatement did not negative every ground of
venue and did not give the plaintiff a better writ. In arriving at this
conclusion, the court said: 11
8-o5 Va. 522, 125 S.E.-d 169 (1962).
Va. Code Ann. § 8-286 (Repl. Vol. 1957) provides:
In an action or suit by or against a person who, from any cause, is incapable of testifying, or by or against the committee, trustee, executor, administrator, heir, or other representative of the person so incapable of
testifying, no judgment or decree shall be rendered in favor of an adverse
or interested party founded on his uncorroborated testimony; and in any
such action or suit, if such adverse party testifies, all entries, memoranda,
and declarations by the party so incapable of testifying made while he was
capable, relevant to the matter in issue, may be received as evidence.
1'203 Va. 938, 128 S.E.2d 444 (1962).
nid. at 943, 1-8 S.E.2d at 447.
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Since John Doe is a fictitious person and has no place of
abode apart from the insurance company, and since notice of
the action must be served on the insurance company which defends the action in the name of John Doe, it may be reasonably concluded, for the purpose of venue, that the action may
be treated as being against the real defendant, the insurance
company, and thus permit the plaintiff to have the protection
for which he has paid. We hold, therefore, that the venue for
the John Doe action, which is not specifically fixed by the uninsured motorist law, is to be determined under the general venue
statutes as if the action against John Doe were against the insurance company itself.
Thus, it seems that after a series of decisions firmly distinguishing
between a tort action against John Doe and a contract action on the
endorsement, the Hodgson decision has failed to pursue this distinction to its logical end. Justice Whittle, in his dissenting opinion, was
quick to point this out, stating that this was an action purely in tort
and against the unknown uninsured motorist, John Doe, and thus the
venue should be laid accordingly. In his opinion the venue should be
limited to the place where the accident occurred, namely where the
cause of action arose. He reasoned that, since John Doe was unknown
his residence too was unknown, and, further, that since the insurer
was not technically a party defendant, the only proper venue was
where the cause of action arose. He points out that there may be many
witnesses willing to testify on behalf of John Doe. If the accident
happens in Alaska, but the insured was covered by a policy containing
the Virginia uninsured motorist endorsement, the action could be
brought in Virginia, requiring the insurance company, filing on behalf of John Doe, to make investigation in Alaska and bring witnesses
from that far State to testify on behalf of John Doe in the Virginia
trial. If the distinction between tort and contract action is to be maintained, this dissent is well taken.
Venue in Virginia is fixed by the statutes, 12 and these statutes13
must be followed in respect to John Doe as with any other defendant.
The court stated that since the venue of an action against John Doe
is not specifically fixed by the uninsured motorist law, venue is to be
determined under the general venue statutes "as if the action against
John Doe were against the insurance company itself."'1 The venue
statutes do fix the venue when John Doe is a defendant, as they do for
every other party litigant. The fact that John Doe is unknown and has
WVrginia & S.W. Ry. v. Hollingsworth, 1o7 Va. 359, 58 S.E. 572 (1907).
"Va. Code Ann. §§ 8-38, 8-39 (Repl. Vol. 1957).
142o3 Va. at 943, 128 S.E.2d at 447.
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no residence merely negates one permissible basis of venue, without
changing the applicability of the venue statute to him. If, in creation
of this legal fiction, John Doe, he is found to be deficient of a residence, then he must be sued where the cause of action arose. The
court should not provide a residence for him by fiat.
The insurance company is not a defendant in the action against
John Doe. It is merely served as if it were one. The uninsured motorist law imposes a considerable contractual burden upon the company,
thought by some to be without adequate consideration, and it should
be strictly construed in determining whether or not the company is an
actual defendant, or whether it merely answers in the name of John
Doe or the known uninsured motorist. If it is an actual defendant,
then the prior holdings of the court excluding the policy or contractual
defenses, are not well founded. If it is not an actual defendant, then
venue should not be determined by reference to its residence.
The majority decision in this Hodgson case, although not explicit
on the point, seems to speak of venue in terms of contract, venue being where the contract is made or where the breach occurs.15 Again, in
deciding venue in this way the court is obscuring the distinction so
carefully made in the prior Brown and Mangus cases.
The final case in point so far reported is Rodgers v. Danko.16
Danko filed suit against Rodgers, a known uninsured, and John Doe,
an unknown uninsured motorist. The insurance company filed a plea
in abatement and a motion to quash process in respect to both defendants alleging that its policy covering the car was issued in New
York, which policy provided that the uninsured motorist coverage
was limited to accidents occurring in New York.1 7 The court sidestepped the policy issues and again returned to the firm distinction
between tort and contract, citing the Brown case to the effect that the
issue being one of contract was not properly before it, and so it would
not consider the question of coverage at this stage of the litigation.
The court reasserted, however, that such ex contractu defenses might
be later interposed in an action on the policy.
This case is highly significant in the final determination of the nature of actions under the Virginia statute. It will be noted in this case
that a known uninsured was sued with John Doe, an unknown uninsured, as a joint tortfeasor. The court, however, made no distinction
"Big Seam Coal Corp. v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 196 Va. 590, 85 S.E.2d 239
(955) interpreting Va. Code Ann. § 8-39 (Repl. Vol. 1957).
"2o4 Va. 14o, 129 S.E.2d 828 (1963).
17Id. at 141, 129 S.E.2d at 829.
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between the two in ruling that a policy or contractual defense could
not be considered in the purely ex delicto action.
Even though there has been some digression by the Hodgson case
from the main line of decisions, and, as will be seen in the Rodgers
case, it must be accepted that the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
is going to continue to draw a hard and fast distinction between contract and tort in actions both against John Doe and the known uninsured motorist. Accepting that this distinction is valid, the practicing defense lawyer is faced with numerous problems concerning his
pleadings. The first of these problems will be discussed and termed
thusly:WHEN

DOES

A DEFENSE SOUND IN TORT AND

IIEN IN CONTRACT?

Certainly any provision in the endorsement or policy which does
not appear in the uninsured motorist statute must be deemed a pure
policy defense and precluded from being raised in an action in tort
against John Doe or the known uninsured motorist.
Now let us consider provisions which may or may not be contained
in the policy but are in the statute itself. May these then be interposed
as defenses in a tort action? It seems clear that if the statutory provision
predicates the right of the insured to recover on his endorsement upon
the insured's complying with certain requirements, then this too will
be deemed a policy defense. In the Brown case the court found that
the statutory requirement of notice ran to the ability or right of the
insured to recover upon the endorsement since the statute contains
the words "in order for the insured to recover under the endorsement
[the insured] shall report the accident as required by § 46.1-4oo."18
Similarly, the action against a known uninsured motorist or John Doe
must be initiated by complying with the statutory provisions of
service 19 if the insured intends to rely on the coverage provided by
paragraph (b) of the statute.2 0 Again the reference to reliance on
the endorsement makes this a contractual defense which may not be
raised in the tort action.
The court, in the Brown case, in deciding whether contact between
the John Doe vehicle and the insured vehicle was necessary, said that
since contact was not required by the statute, it must be a policy de' 2 0 3 Va. at 515, 125 S.E.2d at 164, referring to Va. Code Ann. § 38.1-381(d)
(Supp. 1962).
"Va. Code Ann. § 38.i-381(e)(i) (Supp. 1962).
"Va. Code Ann. § 38.1-38i(b) (Supp. 1962). Paragraph of statute requiring un-

insured mortorist endorsement.
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fense. The court did not say whether this provision of contact in the
policy would be contrary to the dictates of the statute. To what extent
an insurance company may insert provisions in its policy not contained
in the statute must be determined by litigation as the points in question arise. Where the uninsured motorist statute is silent on the requirements of contact, does this necessarily preclude the company
from inserting provisions in its endorsement requiring contact? It
is thought that the court would find that such a provision written in
the policy by the insurance company would be in conflict with the
statute and thus void.
When the statute, however, creates the right of the insured to sue
an uninsured unknown motorist and bases this right on certain statutory definitions of what constitutes an uninsured or unknown motorist, then it is proper for the insurance company to question in the
tort action whether the defendant falls within the statutory definitions
so as to give the plaintiff the bare right to sue. Accordingly, the court
in the Mangus case treated the question of whether the defendant was
"unknown" within the meaning of the statute to be properly before it
in the tort action, rather than being a policy defense, to be raised in
a later contract action.
The court said that due diligence to ascertain the identity of the
unknown motorist was not a requirement of the statute, but pointed
out that the statute simply stated that if the owner or operator is "unknown" he shall be deemed uninsured. It further said that no qualifications are 21placed on the commonly accepted meaning of the word
"unknown." Due diligence not being specifically required by the
statute, the court did not require its exercise, but the court did use
the disquieting words that "under the circumstances there was no reason for him to obtain the name and address of the operator," 22 the circumstances being that the insured did not know that he had been injured. This case may be qualified later by imposing the duty of due
diligence on the insured if he knows he has been injured. 23
In the Faulkner case, the court considered that the evidentiary
character of John Doe's ability to testify was properly before it as a
statutory defense in a tort action and proceeded to rule that the word
"incapable," as used in the dead man statute, is not synonymous with
"unavailable," which is the word used to characterize John Doe.
21

2q3Va. 518 at 520, 125 S.E.2d 166 at 68.
=Ibid.
'348 Va. L. Rev. 1177 at 191 (1962).

86

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXI

By the above it is seen that these purely statutory defenses, as opposed to statutory defenses relating to the endorsement, are permissible in a tort action.
A good deal of difficulty arises, however, when one considers the
juxtaposition of the two parties involved in the Rodgers case. The
plaintiff sued a known uninsured motorist and John Doe, an unknown
uninsured. The motion to quash filed by the insurance company in
respect to both was dismissed by the trial court and not considered on
appeal. Again, as in the Hodgson case, the court seems to have failed
to distinguish between what is tort and what is contract, or as to
what is a permissible statutory defense in a tort action, and what is a
statutory defense relating to the endorsement or contract. There is a
great difference between the legal character of a known uninsured
and John Doe. It does not require a statute to give a plaintiff a right
to sue a known uninsured. While the absence of subsequent reliance on
the uninsured motorist endorsement might render this type of suit
somewhat pyrhhic, such suits did occur long before the uninsured
motorist statute was adopted. On the other hand, the plaintiffs right
24
to sue John Doe is based on the right given to him by the statute.
The motion to quash in the Rodgers case stated that the policy was
issued in New York by the Aetna Company. The facts do not show
whether the vehicle to which the policy applied was principally garaged or used in this State, so as to make the Virginia statute applicable.25 Certainly we may take judicial notice that Aetna is a licensed
insurer in this State, and so could have issued the policy under the
statute. 26 If the policy was issued in New York, and the vehicle was
not principally garaged or used in Virginia, then the provisions of the
subsequent parts of the statute relating to the uninsured motorist endorsement and the creation of John Doe are not applicable. 27 If the
statute does not apply, the plaintiff has no statutory right to sue John
Doe, an unknown uninsured motorist. It is submitted that the defense
offered in respect to John Doe is an entirely permissible statutory defense in a tort action and its character has no reference or relationship
to the contractual obligation of the endorsement or policy. There is
-"Va. Code Ann. § 38.1-381(e) (Supp. 1962).
-Va. Code Ann. § 38.1-381(a) (Supp. 1962).
2Ibid.
21Id. § 38.i- 3 81(b). This subsection in part provides that no such policy or contract shall be so issued or delivered unless it contains the uninsured motorist endorsement. This therefore automatically writes into any policy so issued or delivered the required uninsured motorist endorsement. For the endorsement to be
written in, however, the policy must be issued in Virginia or the vehicle to which
it applies principally garaged in Virginia as provided for in paragraph (a).
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no distinction between this defense and the statutory defenses offered
in the Mangus and Faulkner cases in respect to statutory definitions.
If the plaintiff had no statutory right to sue even in tort then there is
no tort action in which he may obtain a judgment. In respect to the
known uninsured motorist, however, the motion to quash falls under
the heading of the statutory contractual defense as set forth in the second paragraph of this section. The Rodgers case is short and works a
summary dismissal of the company's defenses. It will, in the opinion of
the writer, have far-reaching effects, for it has rendered a permissible
defense in tort available only in a later contract action, thus creating
for the company a danger of waiver if there has been an omission to
present such a tort defense in the original action, in the event of subsequent modification of the Rodgers holding. The court's decision in
this case as to the known uninsured motorist must be conceded to be
well taken, but in respect to John Doe it again constitutes, like the
Hodgson case, a deviation from the carefully drawn lines of the Brown,
Mangus, and Faulkner cases.
In the light of these recent cases the defenses available therefore
may be summarized as follows:- (i) defenses on the merits in tort;
(2) statutory defenses permissible in tort actions; (3) statutory defenses
only permissible in a contract action; and (4) pure policy defenses only
permissible in a contract action.
If the available defenses may be so categorized, it should follow
that since contract defenses are not available in a tort action the omission of such defenses, when answering in tort, does not constitute a
waiver by the insurance company, so that it may still rely on these contract defenses in a subsequent action on the policy.
Where both a statutory defense that is permissible in the tort action, and a defense on the merits are available, a critical question of
waiver arises if the defense lawyer, either through inadvertence or
by hoping to rely upon it in a later action, omits to interpose the
permissible statutory defense in his tort answer.
If he could have pleaded this statutory defense in tort, but omitted
to do so, is the company precluded from relying on the same in a subsequent action in contract on the policy? It is submitted that had the
defense attorneys in the Mangus and Faulkner cases merely filed
defenses on the merits in answer to the tort action and omitted to
raise the statutory defenses of whether or not the defendant was truly
unknown or whether he was incapable of testifying, the company
would be precluded from relying on these defenses in a subsequent action on the policy. In rendering a judgment against John Doe, the
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court has surely decided that he was John Doe and that he was unknown. As is seen, however, from the previous comments in the
Rodgers case, the court itself is not altogether in accord with the view
presented in this article that there is such a clear line between statutory
defenses in tort and statutory defenses in contract, making this problem of waiver more complex.
How SHOULD THE SUIT AGAINST A KNOWN UNINSURED OR
JOHN DOE BE DEFENDED?

In view of the preceding, how then should a defense lawyer representing the insurance company defend the suit instituted under the
Virginia statute? The statute gives the company, after having been
duly served with a copy of the motion for judgment, a right to answer
in its own name, in the name of the uninsured motorist, known or unknown, or in the name of both.2s In order that the defense lawyer may
freely move around within the framework of his pleadings and to
insure that no waiver of defenses or rights has been inadvertently given,
the pleadings which are filed and their contents must be a subject of
very careful study.
Logically, the defenses upon the merits of the case must first be
considered. Should these be filed in the name of the uninsured motorist, known or unknown, in the name of the company, or in the name
of both? Presumably one of the reasons for permitting this type of
dual answer is to obviate the danger of the jury's realizing that an
insurance company, rather than an individual, is responsible. The
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has stated categorically, however,
on two recent occasions that it is error for the trial court to allow
the pleadings to go to the jury, thus informing them that an insurance
company is involved.2 9 The reason behind this statute which authorizes dual pleadings has been mooted. If the jury cannot be so informed,
it is submitted that no pleadings at all should be filed in the name
of John Doe or the known uninsured motorist, but pleadings should
be filed solely in the name of the insurance company.
The exercise of this procedural choice, permitted by the statute,
should not present a danger of a default judgment running against
John Doe or the known uninsured, for it is submitted that whether or
not an answer is filed in the name of the insurance company alone or
in the name of John Doe or the known uninsured motorist, it would
'Va. Code Ann. § 38.i-381(e)(i) (Supp. 1962).
john Doe v. Brown, 203 Va. 508, 516, 125 S.E.2d 159, 165 (1962); Gilliand v.
Singleton, 2o4 Va. i 5 , 129 S.E.2d 641 (1963).
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successfully join issue on the motion for judgment. Certainly, where
an issue of law or fact is properly raised by an answer or other pleading of the defendant a judgment by default cannot be entered against
the defendant.3 0 The statute in giving the insurance company the
right to file in its own name or in the name of the owner or operator
of the uninsured motor vehicle must surely create a species of privity
joining the issue even though the company is not technically the
named defendant.
The pleadings filed in the name of the company in this tort action
should contain defenses as to the merits, including a possible plea of
contributory negligence, and the statutory defenses allowable in the
tort action as referred to above.
Answering solely in the company's name in this manner gives the
defense lawyer a good deal more freedom in any possible settlement
of the case prior to litigation. It may well be, and indeed is usually
the case, that the plaintiff is willing to settle his claim against the
company under the uninsured motorist endorsement of his policy,
but, in settling this claim, he would not be willing to relinguish his
claim against John Doe or the known uninsured motorist in the hopes
that at some future date a judgment against either of them might
become collectible. If the company has filed pleadings in the name of
John Doe or the known uninsured motorist, it is faced with the procedural and possibly ethical problems of withdrawing from the defense of John Doe or the known uninsured motorist in whose name
it has filed pleadings and for whom it has nominally appeared by
counsel.
It will also be remembered that the company is subrogated to the
rights of its insured against John Doe or the known uninsured motorist to the extent of any payments made under the endorsement on
its policy.3 '

If pleadings are filed by the company's counsel in the name of John
Doe or the known uninsured motorist and counsel is later called
upon to assert the company's subrogation rights, he finds himself in
the exteremely awkward position of proceeding against the uninsured
motorist for whom he has previously appeared as counsel in the same
matter.
While the courts have given short shrift to John Doe and known
uninsured motorists, denying to them, it seems, most forms of con3'Dillard v. Thornton, 29 Gratt. (70 Va.) 392 (1877).
Ala. Code Ann § 38.-38i() (Supp. 1962).
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stitutional due process,3 2 they should not be thrown to the wolves. It is
entirely possible that John Doe or the known uninsured motorist purposely omitted to file pleadings in reliance on the fact that the company had already filed a defense. If the company files pleadings solely
in its own name, this problem is obviated to some extent.
Certainly, any order reciting pre-trial settlement, entered by the
court during term and not in vacation, would be notice to John Doe
or the known uninsured, who are properly before the court under the
statute3 3 It is submitted, however, in the interest of caution that, even
when pleadings are filed solely in the name of the company, any order
entered settling the company's liability under the uninsured motorist endorsement of its policy and permitting its counsel to withdraw
from the case, should still recite a granting of leave to John Doe or
the known uninsured motorist of a further twenty-one days to file
such pleadings as he may be advised, for it is not known to what extent John Doe or the known uninsured motorist has relied on the
company's pleadings so as to refrain from answering.
With the defense on the merits so filed and the permissible statutory defenses raised, there can be no danger of the company's waiving
any of its rights, since all contractual defenses may be relied upon in
a later suit on the policy. Thus, the four possible forms of defenses
have been accounted for.
From a defense point of view, it is, of course, most desirable to
have matters of coverage decided prior to any matters of liability, so
that it may withdraw from the action if it is adjudicated that there
is no contractual responsibility on the policy the company has issued.
It is seen by the decisions handed down by the Virginia court during
the past year that no manner of pleadings, whether by demurrer, special plea, motion to dismiss, or summary judgment, can raise a contractual defense in a tort action.
The court in the Rodgers case in refusing to consider what it called
a contract defense said that this may be adjudicated by an action on
the policy or by a motion for a declaratory judgment.34 Presumably, it
was referring to a declaratory judgment after the tort action had decided the question of liability.
32 See comments in John Doe v. Brown,

203

Va. 508, 512, 125 S.E.2d 159, 162

(1962).

1'Va. Code Ann. § 8-371 (Rep1. Vol. 1957). This section provides that in any
action or proceeding at law the court may by consent of the parties enter judgments
or orders in vacation as he might in term. Should the order be entered in term,
however, no such consent of both parties is necessary. If the judgment is correctly
entered it would constitute, therefore, notice to the litigants.
32o4 Va. at 143, 129 S.E.2d at 830.
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No decision has yet been handed down in Virginia concerning
the permissibility of filing for declaratory judgment and asking for the
same to be adjudicated before the tort action has been decided. It is
possible that such an action could be instituted by the company either
before a suit, immediately upon the company's receiving a demand,
or after a suit has been brought against John Doe or the known uninsured motorist. Whether the court would draw any distinction between the nature of the declaratory action in respect to John Doe
and the known uninsured motorist remains to be seen. These possibilities raise problems outside the scope of this article. It should be
remembered, however, that the Virginia court has gone to great
lengths to prevent the tort action from being defeated and will probably pursue this doctrine into the field of declaratory actions.
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